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INTEREST ARBITRATION, OUTCOMES,
AND THE INCENTIVE TO BARGAIN
HENRY S. FARBER and HARRY C. KATZ
DISPUTES between unions and employersover the terms of employment have tra-
ditionally been settled through a bargain-
ing process in which the strike has been the
weapon of last resort. The threat of a strike—
which imposes costs on both parties—acts
as an incentive for the parties to reach a bar-
gained settlement; more formally, the strike
threat creates a "contract zone," or a range
of potential settlements that both parties
consider preferable to a strike. The recent in-
crease in public sector unionization has
sparked efforts to devise procedures for set-
tling labor disputes in that sector without
resort to the strike. Binding third party in-
tervention in the form of interest arbitration
is an alternative that has been utilized in a
number of jurisdictions.'
This study develops a model of bargaining that
demonstrates that an interest arbitration procedure
will encourage negotiated settlements to the extent
that risk aversion dominates the preferences of the
parties and there is uncertainty regarding the arbi-
trator's behavior. The authors conclude that it is likely
that risk aversion does dominate preferences, but the
evidence is not conclusive. They also argue that un-
certainty may be reduced over time for various reasons,
leading to increased use of arbitration and a converg-
ence between the terms of negotiated and arbitrated
agreements.
Henry S. Farber and Harry C. Katz are Assistant
Professors of Economics at Massachusetts Institute
of Technology. They acknowledge the helpful com-
ments of Peter Diamond, Ronald Ehrenberg, Peter
Feuille, David Lipsky, Charles Myers, Melvin Reder,
and Robert Solow.—EDITOR
'States utilizing binding arbitration procedures in
the public sector include Alaska, Connecticut, Iowa,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ne-
vada, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Two criteria have frequently been used to
evaluate interest arbitration and other dis-
pute settlement procedures. The first is the
frequency with which it is necessary to em-
ploy the procedure. It is commonly thought
that a good procedure is one that is seldom
used and that provides an incentive for the
parties to reach a negotiated settlement.^
The rationale for this is that there are
unique aspects to every collective bargain-
ing relationship, which only the parties
themselves can fully appreciate. As with the
strike, the presence of an arbitration pro-
cedure theoretically provides the parties
with an incentive to reach a negotiated set-
tlement by creating a contract zone within
which any settlement is considered by both
parties to be preferable to arbitration. It will
be argued here that the ability of an arbitra-
tion procedure to create such a contract zone
depends in large measure on the risk prefer-
ences of the parties as well as on their un-
certainty concerning the arbitrator's de-
cision.
A second criterion often used to evaluate
dispute settlement procedures is the extent
to which the presence of the procedure cre-
ates an environment in which both the bar-
gained and the arbitrated settlements do not
differ significantly from those the parties
South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyo-
ming. See U.S. Department of Labor, Summary of
Public Sector Labor Relations Policies (Washington,
D.C: Labor-Management Services Administratiorr,
1976).
^For example, see George W. Taylor, Government
Regulation of Industrial Relations (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1948), p. 1.
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would have reached in an environment that
did not include the procedure. The implica-
tion is that a good procedure is one whose
presence biases neither the negotiated nor
the arbitrated settlements. It is contended
here that the dispute settlement mechanism,
be it a strike or a legislatively mandated pro-
cedure such as arbitration, defines the en-
vironment within which bargaining takes
place. Consequently, any analysis of the
impact of dispute settlement procedures
must recognize that the mere presence of the
procedure directly affects negotiated as well
as arbitrated outcomes.
This paper explores these issues by first
developing a model of bargaining in the
presence of an arbitration procedure and
examining the implications of that model
for the usage rates of the arbitration pro-
cedure. We will then develop another bar-
gaining model that enables us to investigate
the potential bias in negotiated outcomes
introduced by the arbitration procedure.
The Analytical Framework
Strikes create a contract zone of potential
settlements considered superior to the strike
outcome by both parties by imposing the
direct costs of forgone income on both par-
ties. Each party is willing to sacrifice some
potential gains in order not to bear the costs
of a strike.'
Assuming that arbitration does not im-
pose any direct costs on the parties, it must
create (define) a contract zone through a
mechanism that is fundamentally differ-
ent from that of the strike.* The major source
of arbitration leverage is derived from the
uncertainty of the parties regarding the be-
havior of the arbitrator: the parties are will-
ing to give up some of the expected gains
from an arbitrated settlement in order to
avoid the attendant uncertainty. It is our
contention that this phenomenon depends
'Hicks argues that".. . most strikes are doubtless the
result of faulty negotiation." See John R. Hicks, The
Theory of Wages (London; MacMillan Press, 1963), p.
146. In other words, the existence of a contract zone
should allow the parties to reach agreement without a
strike in most cases.
*Of course, positive direct costs of arbitration (such
as time and attorney's fees) will tend to create a contract
zone in a manner analogous to a strike.
crucially on the risk preferences of the par-
ties. '
The model developed below utilizes the
analytical construct of maximization of
expected utility by agents in the presence of
uncertainty. This framework was intro-
duced by Von Neumann and Morgenstern
and has become a part of standard economic
analysis.^ The definition of an uncertain
situation used here is that of one in which
the precise outcome is unknown but the par-
ties form well-defined expectations of the
probability distribution of the various pos-
sible outcomes.^
A number of assumptions concerning the
bargaining process, the utility functions of
the parties, and the behavior of the arbitra-
tor are made. First, it is assumed that there
is a homogeneous "pie" of fixed size and
that the parties bargain over the division of
the pie. Let the pie be of size one so that the
share of each party can be represented by a
number between zero and one. Let^a repre-
sent the share of party a and Zb = \-ya rep-
resent the share of party b.
Second, let each party have a utility func-
tion:'
Ua ~ Ua iya) (1)
(2)
and
Further, let Ua(O)= 0, C/i (0) = 0, f/a (1) = 1,
and C/j, (1) = 1.* Assuming positive marginal
'For a more detailed exposition of this framework,
see Duncan R. Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and
Decisions (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957).
^This contrasts with a framework that draws a dis-
tinction between situations in which the agents have
knowledge of a probability distribution of outcomes
(called risk) and situations in which the probabilities
of outcomes are completely unknown or are not mean-
ingful (called uncertainty). See James G. March and
Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1959), pp. 136-42.
'The difficult problem of aggregating individual
preferences into a consistent group preference ordering
is beyond the scope of this study. See Kenneth J. Arrow,
"A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," Jour-
nal of Political Economy, Vol. 58, No. 4 (August 1950),
pp. 328 - 46. An analysis of the problem specific to un-
ions is contained in Wallace N. Atherton, Theory of
Union Bargaining Goals (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1973).
'These assumptions involve linear transformation
of an arbitrary utility index. Under certain general
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utilities, it is clear that the utilities of the
parties are in direct opposition to one an-
other and that the gain of one party is the
loss of the other.
Parameterizations of the utility functions
that satisfy the above constraints are
1 - e^ «"«
Ua = (3)
and
l-e'"
l-e
l-e
(4)
These are convenient functional forms be-
cause, regardless of the values of Ca or Cb,
they always exhibit positive marginal util-
ity and because the risk preferences of the
parties are completely determined by Ca
and Cb. Party a is risk averse, risk neutral, or
risk loving as Ca is, respectively, less than,
equal to, or greater than zero.' The analo-
gous conditions determine the risk prefer-
ences of party b.
Assume further that the arbitrator's role is
to choose a yaA that represents the arbitra-
tor's award to party a. This, of course, deter-
mines b's share (z^ = ( 1 - yaA))- Neither
party knows with certainty what the arbi-
trated setdement will be. However, it is
reasonable to assume that each party forms
expectations about the arbitrator's decision.
Let these expectations be summarized by the
normal distributions
~ N{yaF,
- N(zbF,
(5)
(6)
where yaF and ZbF are the arbitration awards
expected by each party, should the proced-
conditions, such a transformation does not alter the
risk behavior of the parties. See Luce and Raiffa,
Games and Decisions, pp. 12- 38.
'Absolute risk aversion (ARA) of party a is defined as
— U"a
U'
- Ca. Ua and Ub are undefined for ca and ct
equal to zero respectively, but by L'Hospital's rule
lim Ua (ya) = ya which is a linear and hence a risk
Ca - " 0
neutral utility function. The analogous results hold for
party b.
ure be utilized. These may be determined by
some notion of a "fair" settlement, and they
may or may not be equal.'" a | and a I
represent the expected variances of the
awards around yaf and ZbF and hence are a
measure of the uncertainty involved in the
use of the arbitration procedure perceived by
each party.''
Given these prior distributions, each
party calculates the expected utility to them
of using the arbitration procedure:
E{Ua)
and
=
i
(7)
E{Ub) = (8)
where /(y^; JaF. <J I ) and /(z^; z^ f, o ^)
are normal probability density functions
defined in Equations 5 and 6. Using the
definition of a moment-generating function
for a normal density, these integrals have the
analytical solutions.
E{Ua) =
and
E(Ub) =
(9)
(10)
These expected utilities are combined with
the utility functions in order to solve for the
certainty equivalent shares ()>as and z^J,
but or'"Equality is not y^f = bp
identical expectations.
"The arbitrator's award must be constrained to the
unit interval while the normal distribution implies a
nonzero probability of an award outside the unit inter-
val. It is assumed here that o I and o | are suffici-
ently small so that the probabilities of an award out-
side the unit interval are insignificant. If this is true,
use of an unbounded distribution does not seriously
alter the results.
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which are the ya and Zb that, received with
certainty, would yield the same utilities as
those expected from arbitration:
1 -
(11)
and
ybs -ybF -T °b'^b (16)
where ybF is party b's prior expectation of
the arbitrator's decision of a's share.
Thus, a will accept any negotiated settle-
ment (yn) satisfying )>„ > yas and b will
accept any negotiated settlement satisfying
yn < ybs- Thus, the contract zone or range
of potential settlements is
1 -
(12)
l-e'
Solving Uas = £(Ua) and Ub, = E{Ub) from
Equation 9 through 12 for y i^ and z^ ^ yields
and
7<'
(13)
(14)
If the parties are risk averse (ca < O,Cb < 0)
then yas < yaF and Zf,, < ZbF- Intuitively,
the parties would be willing to settle with
certainty for less than the expected arbitra-
tion award. This sacrifice is essentially a
payment to avoid the disutility of the risk of
arbitration. Alternatively, if the parties are
risk lovers (c^  > 0, Cj > 0) then yas > yaF
and Zbs > Zf,p and the parties must be paid a
premium in order to be discouraged from
"enjoying" the risk of the arbitration pro-
cess.
Assuming that the parties are expected
utility maximizers, party a would prefer to
negotiate any settlement ya > yas rather
than resort to arbitration while party b
would prefer to negotiate any settlement
^b > Zbs rather than resort to arbitration. In
order to determine if there is a zone of po-
tential agreement (a contract zone), note
that if Zj,^  is the minimum share for b that
will cause b to prefer a negotiated settle-
ment, then 1 - Zj,^  = y^s is the maximum
share that b would be willing to give a and
still prefer a negotiated settlement. From
Equation 14
(15)
+ a (17)
If A is less than or equal to zero, there is no
contract zone and the arbitration procedure
will be used.'2 (The question of the point in
any existing contract zone at which the par-
ties actually negotiate a settlement will be
discussed later.)
Examination of Equation 17 shows that
the contract zone is defined by the risk pref-
erences of the parties and the expectations
of the parties concerning the arbitrator's be-
havior. In view of the fact that the contract
zone sets the bounds for negotiated settle-
ments, it is clear that the arbitrator's ex-
pected behavior directly affects negotiated
settlements. We next investigate the role
that risk preferences and expectations about
the arbitrator's award play in determining
the size of the contract zone and, hence, the
frequency of use of the procedure.
Frequency of Use
It is clear from Equation 17 that the larger
the difference between y f^ and y^^ is, the
larger the contract zone will be. in other
words, if the parties have relatively pessi-
mistic expectations about the arbitrator's
award, then there may be room for a negoti-
ated settlement. On the other hand, if the
parties have relatively optimistic expecta-
tions about the behavior of the arbitrator,
then this will tend to discourage a negoti-
ated settlement by reducing the contract
zone.
and
problems of communication are abstracted
from, and it is assumed tbat if tbere is a contract zone
then the parties find it.
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While there is no reason to assume that
the parties' expectations vary in any sys-
tematic fashion, it may be true that when a
procedure is first introduced the parties have
differing and inaccurate expectations about
the arbitrator's behavior. If this difference is
relatively pessimistic (optimistic), the pro-
cedure will be invoked less (more) fre-
quently than it would be, given accurate
expectations.
It is reasonable to believe that over time
the parties learn about the arbitrator's be-
havior both through their own experience
and, indirectly, through the experience of
others. This learning will have two effects
on the parties' prior distributions of the ar-
bitrator's expected behavior. First, it is ex-
pected that the means of the prior distribu-
tions {yaF and ybF) will converge to a com-
mon value {yp). Second, the variance of the
distributions ( a \ and a I ) will converge
to a common value (a )^ and fall as the par-
ties form more accurate expectations of the
arbitrator's behavior.
With the convergence of expectations in
the long run. Equation 17—representing
the size of the contract zone ( A)—can be
rewritten as
A = - i a'^\c + cJ. (18)
Recall that Ca < 0 and ct < 0 imply risk
aversion on the part of a and b respectively.
If both parties are risk averse then Ca + Cfc < 0,
which implies that A > 0 and that there is a
contract zone.
The weaker condition for the existence of
a contract zone given identical expectations
is that risk aversion dominates {Ca"^ c^ < 0).
It is not necessary that both parties be risk
averse but only that the party which is risk
averse be averse to risk more than the extent
to which the other party loves risk.
In the simple world described above, the
parties have identical expectations and,
consequently, the utilization decision is
completely determined by the relative risk
preferences. Although identical expecta-
tions may be rare, it is reasonable to con-
clude that the relative risk preferences of the
parties are an important determinant of the
size of any contract zone and that short-run
differences in expectations concerning the
arbitrator's decision serve to modify the po-
tential contract zone implied by the relative
risk preferences of the parties.
It was demonstrated above that the rela-
tive risk preferences of the parties are cru-
cial to the ability of an arbitration procedure
to create a contract zone. For the procedure
to be effective in the long run, risk aversion
must dominate; yet, we have no idea if it does
or will. There is almost a total absence of
empirical evidence concerning the risk
preferences of the parties in a collective bar-
gaining situation. It is often assumed by
neoclassical economists that firms in the
private sector are risk-neutral profit maxi-
mizers. On the other hand, a significant
degree of risk aversion was found in a recent
study of the preferences of union members."
If these findings are representative, it seems
reasonable to believe that risk aversion dom-
inates in the private sector.
In the public sector—the primary locus of
interest arbitration procedures—there is no
generally accepted objective function for
the employer, but some tentative notions on
the relative risk preferences of unions and
employers can be developed. First, there is
reason to expect that union members in
the public sector are at least as risk averse
as those in the private sector.'^ Second, the
public sector union is likely to exhibit more
risk aversion than the employer. One reason
for this is the fact that wages are the primary
source of income of union members, and
the penalties for losing the members' pri-
mary income source are liable to be severe.
On the other hand wages are not the only
expense of the government unit and the
taxes that finance wages account for only a
small share of the expenses of the citizenry.
In the context of the model developed
earlier, it is likely that the union (party a) is
risk averse (c^  < 0) and the public sector
employer is less risk averse (Cj, > c,,). While
it seems that the usual situation will be one
of risk aversion dominating {Ca + Cb < 0),
there is no convincing evidence of this. Risk-
"Henry S. Farber, "Individual Preferences and Un-
ion Wage Determination: The Case of the United Mine
Workers," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 86, No.
6 (October 1978), pp. 923-42.
'••It can be argued that public sector jobs are more
secure and therefore attract more risk-averse individ-
uals.
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loving behavior by the employer (or, how-
ever implausible, by the union) may imply
dominance of risk-loving behavior (c^ + Cj
> 0). With identical expectations about
arbitrator behavior, this situation implies
no contract zone, resulting in the parties'
complete reliance on the procedure or a total
"chilling" of bargaining.
Implicit in the preceding discussion is the
assumption that some uncertainty persists
in the long run ( a ^ > O). Although experi-
ence with the arbitration procedure will
reduce the uncertainty, changing economic
conditions and differences among arbitra-
tors will probably negate the possibility
that the parties can ever predict arbitrators'
awards with certainty. If, however, all un-
certainty were removed ( a ^ = 0), then it is
clear from Equation 18 that the contract
zone would disappear. The parties would
have no incentive to negotiate any settle-
ment different from what the arbitrator
would award. In this situation any dis-
cussion of the utilization rate of the arbitra-
tion procedure is moot because negotiated
and arbitrated settlements would be identi-
cal. However, the shrinkage of the contract
zone as the uncertainty disappears has the
important implication that it reduces the
ability of the parties to consider factors of
which they alone are aware and which they
can evaluate in reaching a negotiated settle-
ment.
It has been argued that conventional ar-
bitration "chills bargaining" because the
parties have little or no uncertainty about
the arbitrators' behavior.'* Final-offer arbi-
tration has been suggested as an alternative
to conventional arbitration that is "well
designed to . . . [generate] just the kind of
uncertainty about the location of the arbi-
tration award that is well calculated to . . .
compel [the parties] to seek security in agree-
ment."'^ Thus, final-offer arbitration was
"The so-called chilling effect of arbitration is dis-
cussed by Peter Feuille, "Final Offer Arbitration and
the Chilling Effect," Industrial Relations, Vol. 14,
No. 3 (October 1975), pp. 302- 10 and Harry H. Well-
ington and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The Unions and the
Cities (Washington, D.C: The Brookings Insti-
tution, 1971).
'*Carl M. Stevens, "Is Compulsory Arbitration
Compatible with Bargaining?" Industrial Relations,
Vol. 5, No. 1 (February 1966), pp. 38- 52.
conceived as a technique for increasing the
uncertainty about the arbitrator's decision.
Unless risk aversion dominates, however, an
increase in uncertainty will not increase the
size of the contract zone. This can be demon-
strated by differentiating Equation 18 with
respect to a ^ as follows:
8 A (19)
which is greater than (or less than) zero as
risk aversion (or risk loving) dominates. Ad-
ditionally, even if risk aversion dominates, it
is not at all clear that a final-offer procedure
involves more uncertainty than a conven-
tional arbitration procedure, because the
parties themselves have control over the
final offers and hence can influence the
probabilities of their award being chosen."
The other criterion, discussed earlier, for
evaluating the impact of a change in the
arbitration procedure is the extent to which
the introduction of a new procedure changes
the terms of the settlement both in situa-
tions in which the procedure is used and
those in which it is not. In order to investi-
gate this problem, we now develop a simple
bargaining theory of the determination of
the negotiated settlement.
Impact on Negotiated Settlements
Let us assume that the relative bargaining
power of the parties are such that a certain
proportion ( $ ) of the contract zone is al-
ways captured by party a and that this is true
regardless of the size or location of the con-
tract zone.'^ Since the certainty equivalent
"This discussion of final-offer arbitration is sug-
gestive but not complete. Analysis of final-offer
schemes is complicated by the endogeneity of the final
offers. A model specific to the final-offer case is de-
veloped by Henry S. Farber, "An Analysis and Evalua-
tion of Final Offer Arbitration," working paper no.
242, Department of Economics, M.I.T., 1979.
"The parameter 0 measures the aspect of bargain-
ing power that determines the share of a given con-
tract lone captured by each party. This is distinguished
from those aspects of bargaining power that deter-
mine the location of the contract zone. The latter is
largely a function of the relative costs of disagreement
(relative risk preferences in this model), while the
former is largely a function of relative bargaining
skills. However, to the extent that 0 is also a function
of relative risk preferences, this analysis becomes
more complicated.
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share of party a {yas) is the lower bound of
any positive contract zone, the actual nego-
tiated settlement under the simple bargain-
ing power model is
yn=yas + ^  ^ (20)
where 0 1 $ 4 1. Of course, this only ap-
plies where A is greater than zero. If A is less
than zero then there is no contract zone and
arbitration is invoked.
Maintaining the assumption of identical
and accurate expectations about the arbi-
trator's behavior and substituting from
Equations 13 and 18 into Equation 20 for
yas and A yields'^
y^=yj, + L a^Ca-^^ a\Ca+c^) or (21)
If party a has all of the bargaining power
($=1), thenyn =yp - 1 a ^C;,, which is sim-
ply party b's certainty equivalent maximum
share (y^ )^ for party a.^ " Alternatively, if
party b has all of the bargaining power
($ = 0), then yn =y f + j a^  Ca, which is simply
party a's certainty equivalent minimum
share {yas)- In general O will not take on
either of these extreme values but will lie
somewhere between zero and one.
It is clear from Equation 22 that the ex-
pectation of the arbitrator's award {yp) is a
major determinant of the negotiated settle-
ment. Any change in y^ will be passed
3 y
through on a one-for-one basis ( g " = 1)
to the negotiated settlement. In fact, as dis-
cussed previously, when the parties can pre-
dict the arbitrator's award with certainty
(a ^=0), the negotiated settlement is exactly
the predicted arbitrator's award.
The general approach used by others in
evaluation of arbitration schemes is to com-
pare negotiated with arbitrated settle-
I'Accurate expectations are defined as the case in
which the mean and variance of the prior distribution
of the arbitrator's award are in fact the parameters of
the actual distribution. This does not imply that the
parties know the arbitrator's award with certainty.
"See Equation 16.
ments." Any deviation is presumed to be
evidence of a bias on the part of the arbitra-
tor. However, it follows from Equation 22
that
yn- yf = - ^ a n ( i - $ ) c , - $ c , ] . (23)
Thus, the difference between negotiated
and arbitrated settlements is not a function
of the expected arbitrator's award {yp).
Rather, it is a function of the uncertainty
regarding the arbitrator's award ( a ''), the
relative bargaining power of the parties
( $), and the relative risk preferences of the
parties {Ca and Cb)- Any change in the aver-
age arbitrator's award {yp) will change the
negotiated outcomes by the same amount
and, consequently, will not be detected by a
simple comparison of negotiated and arbi-
trated outcomes.
A change in the uncertainty about the
arbitrator's award ( a 2) can also affect the
location of the negotiated outcomes. Differ-
entiation of yn in Equation 22 with respect
to a ^ yields
0 O
(24)
The sign of this expression is indeter-
minant and depends on the relative risk
preferences as well as the relative bargaining
powers of the parties. Given that risk aver-
sion dominates ( ( Q + c;,) < 0 ) , the
necessary and sufficient condition for an
increase in uncertainty to increase yn
that
(25)
2'Among others, see David B. Lipsky and John E.
Drotning, "The Relation Between Teacher Salaries
and the Use of Impasse Procedures Under New York's
Taylor Law: 1968-1972," Journal of Collective
Negotiations in the Public Sector, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1977),
pp. 229-44; James L. Stern, Charles M. Rehihus,
J. Joseph Loewenberg, Hirschel Kasper, and Barbara
D. Dennis, Final-Offer Arbitration (Lexington, Mass.:
D.C. Heath, 1975); and Mark Thompson and James
Cairnie, "CompulsoryArbitration: TheCaseofBritish
Columbia Teachers," Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 (October 1973), pp. 3-17.
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While $ measures the relative bargaining
power of party a, Cg measures the risk
Ca + C A
aversion of party a relative to the total risk
aversion of the two parties. Intuitively,
Equation 25 has the implication that the
share of party a will increase with an in-
crease in the uncertainty inherent in the
procedure if the relative bargaining power
of party a is high enough to offset party
a's risk aversion.
The most important conclusion that can
be drawn from this portion of the analysis is
that an increase in the uncertainty sur-
rounding the arbitrator's award will bias the
outcomes of negotiated settlements, syn „,
^ Sa^ '
unless Equation 25 holds with equality, i.e..
0 = - ^ (26)
There is no reason why this should be true,
and it will only be the merest coincidence if,
in fact, it is. Thus, it can be concluded that
in general any change in the arbitration pro-
cedure that increases the uncertainty will
bias the outcomes of negotiated settlements.
The direction of the bias depends on the re-
lationship between the bargaining power
and the relative risk preferences of the par-
ties.
Previous discussion suggested that there
are reasons to expect that in the public sec-
tor, the union is likely to be more risk averse
than the employer. Assume for expository
purposes that the union is in fact "twice"
as risk averse as the employer and that party
a is the union. In other words, c^ - 2cb < 0.
Substitution into Equation 26 yields the
result that the bargaining power of the un-
ion must be such that it captures exactly
two-thirds of the contract zone ($ = |) in
order that a change in the uncertainty in-
herent in the procedure not bias the out-
comes of negotiated settlements. If 0 > j
then -—— > 0 and the union will gain from
da 2
the increase in uncertainty. Obviously, if
the bargaining powers are equal ($ = ^ ), then
the union will lose because it is the more risk
Consider the case in which the employer
is risk neutral (Cf, = 0). Substitution into
Equation 25 implies that the union can
never gain from a riskier procedure. In fact,
in order to maintain its position, the union's
bargaining power must be such that it cap-
tures the entire contract zone ( $=1). In this
polar case it is unlikely that the union will
have such power, and as a result it will suffer
from a change to a procedure that involves
more uncertainty.
To summarize, the change to an arbitra-
tion procedure that involves more uncer-
tainty will increase the size of the contract
zone only as long as risk aversion domi-
nates. This implies a higher probability of
achieving a negotiated settlement. How-
ever, unless by chance the relative differ-
ence in risk preferences between the parties
is exactly offset by differences in the bargain-
ing power of the parties the outcomes of
negotiated settlements will be biased by the
change in the procedure.
Summary and Implications
In this study a model of the use of arbi-
tration procedures and the outcomes of ne-
gotiated settlements in the presence of arbi-
tration procedures was developed. The
major implication of the analysis is that the
presence of any arbitration procedure de-
termines the environment within which the
parties negotiate, and consequently, directly
affects the terms of negotiated agreements.
This result has an important implication
for the evaluation of arbitration (or any
other mechanism) as a dispute settlement
procedure. Introduction of a new dispute
settlement procedure or any modification
of an existing procedure will have an effect
on negotiated agreements, and it is just this
effect that makes assessment of any change
in the dispute settlement mechanism diffi-
cult. Simple comparisons of negotiated set-
tlements with arbitrated awards will be mis-
leading because they ignore the effect of the
^li the parties have equal bargaining power, they
must be equally risk averse for a change in uncertainty
not to affect negotiated outcomes. The converse is also
INTEREST ARBITRATION, OUTCOMES AND INCENTIVE 63
procedure on negotiations.^^ In the context
of the simple model developed here, it was
demonstrated that a shift in the average
arbitration award would shift the average
negotiated settlement by the same amount.
The measured difference between arbitrated
and negotiated outcomes would be un-
changed. Hence, this difference cannot be
used as a measure of bias in the arbitration
procedure.
The difference between arbitrated and
negotiated settlements, while not a function
of the average arbitrated award, was found
to be related to the relative risk preferences
and bargaining power of the parties as well
as to the uncertainty regarding the arbitra-
tor's behavior. The ability of an arbitration
procedure to induce the parties to reach a
negotiated settlement is due to the costs re-
sulting from the uncertainty associated
with the arbitrator's behavior. Thus, ne-
gotiated settlements will be less favorable
to the party who is more risk averse. This
effect must be considered when imple-
menting any procedure that relies on un-
certainty to encourage bargaining.
It was found that uncertainty about the
arbitration award will create a range of po-
tential negotiated settlements only if risk
aversion dominates. While it seems likely
^'Additionally, note that because of initial differ-
ences in expectations about tbe behavior of the arbi-
trators and because it may take time to learn about
the behavior of the arbitrators, studies that attempt to
measure the long-run impact of changes in procedures
shortly after they are instituted are bound to be mis-
leading.
that risk aversion does dominate, serious
empirical investigation of the relative risk
preferences of the parties would be useful.
It is likely that as the parties become fa-
miliar with arbitrators and the arbitration
procedure, the uncertainty surrounding the
procedure will be reduced. This may result
in increased usage of the procedure as the
contract zone shrinks. However, the more
important effect is that all settlements (ne-
gotiated and arbitrated) will tend to con-
verge as the uncertainty is reduced. This
raises serious questions concerning the role
of factfinding and the use of arbitration as
an extension of the negotiating process. To
the degree that arbitrators rely on the results
of factfinding in making their awards, fact-
finding provides information to the parties
concerning the arbitrator's behavior. This
reduces the uncertainty inherent in the ar-
bitration procedure and constrains the
range of negotiated outcomes.
The direct exchange of information be-
tween the arbitrator and the parties will
similarly reduce the uncertainty concerning
the arbitrator's behavior. Any negotiated
agreements reached after such an exchange
of information are likely to reflect very
closely the potential arbitrator's award.
These considerations suggest that, in order
to preserve the uncertainty surrounding
the arbitration process and to encourage
real bargaining, allowing the arbitrator to
act as a mediator and other mechanisms
that provide flows of information from the
arbitrator to the parties will be counter-
productive.

